The Inextricable Link Between Conditionals and Logical Consequence by Silva, Matheus
THE INEXTRICABLE LINK BETWEEN 
CONDITIONALS AND LOGICAL 
CONSEQUENCE 
Draft of February 24, 2020 
Matheus Silva 
ABSTRACT 
There is a profound, but frequently ignored, relationship between the classical conception of 
logical consequence and the material implication. The first repeats the patterns of the latter, 
but with a wider modal reach. This relationship suggests that there should be also a 
connection between the notion of logical consequence and the conditional connective of any 
given logical system. This implies that it is incoherent to propose alternatives to the material 
implication while maintaining the classical conception of logical consequence. The other 
important implication is that we need to posit different conceptions of logical consequence 
that are consistent with different theories of conditionals in order to evaluate their relative 
merits from new and unexplored angles. As a pilot study of this research program we evaluate 
two new notions of logical consequence motivated by conditional-assertion theory and 
possible world theories. Those alternatives are compared unfavourably with the classical 
conception of logical consequence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Intuitively, conditional statements express some sort of deductive reasoning, but the precise 
nature of this relation is controversial. It seems obvious that if p entails q, then p → q  is 1
necessarily true, and vice versa. This relation, however, does not hold in most cases, since 
most true conditionals are not necessarily true. Yet there is another connection that was 
ignored: the connection between the classical conception of logical consequence and the 
material implication . This connection implies that it is incoherent to propose alternatives to 2
the material implication  while maintaining the classical conception of logical consequence. 3
The other important implication is that we need to posit different conceptions of logical 
consequence that are consistent with different theories of conditionals in order to evaluate 
 I will adopt the notation where ‘→’ stands for natural language conditionals and ‘⊃’ stands for material 1
implication. I will use small letters such as p, q and r for propositional variables, and A, B, C for formula 
variables.  
 The term ‘material implication’ fell into disuse because of Quine’s accusation that it involves a use-mention 2
fallacy. I disagree with his assessment. See my ‘If-then’ as a version of ‘Implies’ (unpublished) for a detailed 
rebuttal of Quine’s argument.  
 It is important to make a distinction between the material implication as a formal connective of classical logic, 3
the material relation that it satisfies when it is true and natural language expressions that carry an implicit claim 
to a material implication. When one maintains that natural language conditionals can be interpreted as being 
logically equivalent to a material implication, what it is meant is that they satisfy the truth conditions posited by 
the truth table of the material implication, and not that their implicit claim to a relation material implication is 
true, otherwise every material implication in natural language would be by definition true, which is implausible.
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their relative merits from new and unexplored angles. This paper will be short and to the 
point. A survey of the relevant examples that suggest the connection between the classical 
conception of logical consequence and the material implication is presented in section 2. The 
alternative notions of logical consequence motivated by conditional-assertion and possible 
world theories are discussed in section 3. Those notions turn out to be equivalent due to a 
commitment with the Ramsey’s test and are ultimately deemed unsatisfactory. The section 4 
concludes with a brief observation about the potential advantages of an implication heuristic 
in our understanding of conditionals.  
2.  A BRIDGE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS 
The material implication p ⊃  q amounts to a claim that a premise p materially implies a 
conclusion q if, and only if, it is not the case that both p is true and q is false in a given world 
that is assumed as a parameter. This reference to a parameter world is justified by the fact that 
possible world theories always redirect us to the closest-p world to evaluate the truth value of 
a conditional, but in this p-world the relation of implication between p and q is also material. 
In order to make sense of the classical use of material implication and differentiate it from its 
use in possible world theories, we observe that in the second, but not the first, the parameter 
world is always the closest one where p is true. The mention of a premise and a conclusion 
instead of the traditional notions of antecedent and consequent is also intentional: since we 
are talking about interpreting conditionals as a material implication, and since this is an 
implication relation in some special sense, the antecedent and consequence of a conditional 
should be interpreted as a premise and a conclusion, respectively. 
That aforementioned connection occurs because the unrestricted notion of logical 
consequence, the formal implication, repeats the patterns of a restricted notion of logical 
consequence, the material implication. The only difference between the two is that in the first 
case the relation of implication has a wider modal reach, so to speak. If the relation of p 
materially implying q is valid when p is false or q is true, then the relation of A formally 
implying B is valid when A is a contradiction or B is a tautology. In other words, the validity 
of formal implication  will depend on how we interpret the validity of material implication, 4
and vice versa. See the table bellow. 
Antecedent Strengthening Left Weakening (Monotonicity)
p ⊃ q ⊨ (p&r) ⊃ q      if A ⊨ B, then A&C ⊨ B 
Exportation Deduction Theorem
(p&q) ⊃ r ⊨ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r) if A&B ⊨ C, then A ⊨ B ⊃ C
Hypothetical Syllogism Transitivity of Entailment
p ⊃ q, q ⊃ r ⊨ p ⊃ r if A ⊨ B and B ⊨ C, then A ⊨ C
Conditional Negation Condition Negation Proof
      p ⊃ q ⇆ ¬(p&¬q)       A ⊨ B ⇆ ¬◇(A&¬B)
Conditional Antisyllogism Principle of Antisyllogism
 I will use ‘formal implication’ as synonymous with ‘valid argumentative form’. This term is useful because it 4
helps to highlight the contrasts and similarities with material implication. 
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There are two degrees of implication here. In first degree we have the relation of material 
implication, which is bounded or restricted by a given world taken as a parameter. In the 
second degree we have a relation of formal implication which ensures that in every possible 
world in which their premises are true, their truth is preserved. In this case, the relation of 
implication may involve relations of material implication in the premises or conclusion, or 
both; or relations of formal implication themselves, which may involve relations of material 
implication or not. The important thing is that the same pattern of implication presented in 
first degree is repeated in the second degree.  
Take for instance the relation between transitivity of entailment and hypothetical 
syllogism. The first states that if A formally implies B, and B formally implies C, then this 
formally implies that A formally implies C; while the later states that if p materially implies 
q, and q materially implies r, then this formally implies that p materially implies r. This 
means that hypothetical syllogism can be considered as a restricted form of transitivity of the 
material implication. Another example is the relation between antecedent strengthening and 
left weakening. The first states that if p materially implies q this formally implies that the 
conjunction of p and r materially implies q; whereas the second states that if A formally 
implies B, this formally implies that the conjunction of A and C formally implies B. Now 
consider the examples presented in the table bellow.  
In the case of the first paradox, a material implication trivially holds because the antecedent is 
false in the world parameter, and in the ex contradictione quodlibet, a formal implication 
trivially holds because the antecedent is false in every possible world. In the second paradox, 
the material implication trivially holds because the consequent is true in the parameter world, 
whereas in the trivial validity the formal implication trivially holds because the conclusion is 
true in every possible world. In both examples the relations of formal implication mirror the 
(p&q) ⊃ r ⊨ (p&¬r) ⊃ ¬q if A&B ⊨ C, then A&¬C ⊨ ¬B
Contraposition Contraposition Proof
p ⊃ q ⇆ ¬q ⊃ ¬p A ⊨ B ⇆ ¬B ⊨ ¬A
Or-to-If General Or-to-If
p ⊃ q ⇆ ¬p∨q A ⊨ B ⇆ ⧠(¬A∨B)
Disjunction Principle General Disjunction Principle
(p&q) ⊃ r ⇆ p ⊃ (¬q∨r) A&B ⊨ C ⇆ A ⊨ ¬B∨C
Antecedent Disjunction Introduction Antecedent Disjunction Introduction Proof
((p ⊃ q) & (r ⊃ q)) ⊨ ((p ∨ r) ⊃ q) if A ⊨ B and C ⊨ B, then (A ∨ C) ⊨ B 
Conjunctive Syllogism Conditional Conjunctive Syllogism  
(¬(p&q) & p) ⊃ ¬q ¬(A&B) & A ⊨ ¬B 
Limited Transitivity   Limited Transitivity Proof  
p ⊃ q, (p&q) ⊃ r ⊨ p ⊃ r if A ⊨ B and (A&B) ⊨ C, then A ⊨ C 
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First Paradox of Material Implication Ex Contradictione Quodlibet 
¬p ⊨ p ⊃ q A&¬A, then A&¬A ⊨ B 
Second Paradox of Material Implication Trivial Validity 
q ⊨ p ⊃ q B∨¬B, then A ⊨ B∨¬B
behaviour of material implication, with the exception that the first covers all possible worlds 
while the later is restricted to a given parameter world. 
Formal implication and material implication are tied in such a fundamental manner that 
our intuitions, arguments and hypotheses about the first should be translated in intuitions, 
arguments and hypotheses about the later. This relation represents a bridge between formal 
implication and material implication, and consequently, conditionals. This connection is of 
the most importance because conditional logic experts tend to be very critical of the material 
implication while simultaneously accepting the classical notion of formal implication. They 
will be inclined to accept argumentative forms such as ex contradictione and trivial validity at 
the same time they reject the first and the second paradox of material implication. This 
differential treatment probably occurs because the classical notion of formal implication is 
fairly simple and intuitive, whereas the material implication is still poorly understood given 
its close ties to natural language . The material implication is susceptible to a wide variety of 5
biases that muddle our perception of the issue and clouds our understanding . 6
3. ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 
According to possible world theories, p → q is true iff either q is true in the closest p-world, 
or p is impossible. If q is false in the closest-p world, the conditional is false . David Lewis 7
(1973) offers a distinct version inspired by the same idea. The difference in this case is that p 
→ q is true if, and only if, in every possible p-world that is as closest to the actual world as 
the truth of p allows, q is true. There are many other possible worlds semantics inspired on 
the same idea . In any case, our core objection holds for any possible world semantics 8
employed, since it is directed against the pre-theoretic intuitions that motivate them. From 
here on I will take Stalnaker’s semantics as default and refer it as vanilla possible world 
semantics or simply possible world account. The possible world account denies the following 
argumentative forms:  
• antecedent strengthening (AS), for q can be true in the closest p-world, but false in the 
closest p&r-world;  
• hypothetical syllogism (HS), for even if q is true in the closest p-world and r is true in 
the closest q-world, r can be false in the closest p-world; 
 Another direction is to interpret ‘if-then’ constructions as both attempts to establish a material implication 5
relation and connectives. In this case, ‘therefore’ constructions or deductive arguments should also be viewed as 
both connectives and attempts to establish a formal implication. The only difference is that in the case of an 
argument the truth value of the sentence that says that the premises imply the conclusion is dependent of the 
truth values of the premises in all possible worlds in which they are true. The reason why I’m not adopting this 
strategy is that it is less elegant than the present interpretation that views both conditionals and ‘therefore’ 
constructions solely as claims to implication relations. Moreover, it would make things even more confusing by 
bringing the attempts to establish formal implication in the midst of connectives. The more insightful way we 
can do is to remove conditionals from the other connectives, and not add formal implication as an additional 
connective.
 For different explanations of the supposed biases see Ajdukiewicz (1956), Allott & Uchida (2009a; 2009b), 6
Clark (1971), Hanson (1991), Lewis (1976), Grice (1989), Jackson (1987, 2006), Mellor (1993), Noh (1998); 
Rieger (2006; 2013); Smith (1983), Smith & Smith (1988) and Silva (2017).
 Stalnaker (1975).7
 See Davis (1979).8
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• contraposition (CON), because q can be true in the closest p-world while ¬p is false in 
the closest ¬q-world; 
• the first paradox of material implication (FPM), because q could be false in the 
closest-p world even if ¬p is true in the actual world; 
• the second paradox of material implication (SPM), because q could be false in the 
closest-p world even if q is true in the actual world. 
The consequence of this is the denial of the following argumentative forms: 
• left weakening (LW): if a relation of material implication cannot be monotonic, neither 
should be a relation of formal implication; 
• transitivity of entailment (TE): if the relations of material implication in the 
hypothetical syllogism are not transitive, neither are the relations of formal implication 
in an argumentative form; 
• contraposition proof (CP): if the falsity of the conclusion (i.e., the consequent) in a 
material implication relation does not imply the falsity of the premise (i.e., the 
antecedent), then the falsity of a conclusion in a formal implication does not imply the 
falsity of the premise; 
• ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ): if a material implication does not follow trivially 
from a false premise (i.e., the antecedent), then a formal implication will not follow 
trivially from a contradictory premise; 
• trivial validity (TV): if a material implication does not follow trivially from a true 
conclusion (i.e., the consequent), then a formal implication will not follow trivially 
from a necessary conclusion. 
I’m not sure that most people would be willing to adopt such revisionist consequences based 
on criticisms to the material implication, but that’s the price they will have to pay for the sake 
of coherence. There is no doubt that argumentative forms such as (LW), (TE) and (CP) 
represent a fundamental aspect of any believable notion of logical consequence. (ECQ) and 
(TV) are more controversial and the proponent of the possible world account could argue that 
denying (ECQ) is a consequence that should be seen as a bonus and not a hindrance. After all, 
we already have system of paraconsistent logics specifically crafted to deal with 
contradictions in a way that prevents them from implying anything. But the reason why this 
answer is unconvincing in this case is that the possible world account also has its own device 
of triviality that is reminiscent of (ECQ), namely, that p → q is true when p is impossible. 
This is not consistent with the type of thinking we would expect from the denial of (ECQ). 
Besides, it would not be a stretch to suggest that most people will accept them.  
One could argue that argumentative forms such as (AS), (HS) and (CON) are not 
inconsistent with the possible world account after all. They only seem inconsistent with the 
theory if we make an illicit context shift in the evaluation of an argumentative form. If the 
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context is maintained fixed, those argumentative forms will turn out valid in the possible 
world account (Brogaard and Salerno, 2008). While it is undeniable that avoiding contextual 
fallacies remains a fundamental tenet of semantics, this solution doesn’t have its intended 
effect in regard to the possible world account for two reasons. First, if we follow this stricture 
through, it will imply that (FPM) and (SPM) are valid as well (Silva, 2017). This result would 
undermine the whole reason for a possible world account in the first place. Second, as Cross 
(2011) so eloquently put it, there is no such thing as a contextual fallacy as far as the possible 
world system is concerned. The contextual fallacy is embedded in the very truth conditions of 
the logic system which were motivated by modal intuitions that rely on context shifting. So 
there is no way to correct it by simply adding further restrictions in the evaluation of 
conditionals. 
Now, let’s move on to conditional-assertion theories. They state that if q is an assertive 
act, p → q is used to conditionally assert that q given p . One of the most surprisingly 9
features of conditional-assertion theory is its non-propositional requirement. The theory states 
that A → B is just a conditional act of B given A. Thus, it is not a proposition with truth 
values, much less a connective that combines two propositions to produce an additional 
proposition whose truth values are determined by its propositional constituents . This puts 10
conditionals in an entirely new light. Instead of being seen as static truth-functions, 
conditionals are now portrayed as action movements in natural language. Conditional-
assertion theories will deny the following argumentative forms:  
• (AS): one could be willing to assert q given the assumption of p, but not under the 
assumption of p&r;  
• (HS): one could be willing to assert q under the assumption of p or r under the 
assumption of q, but not r under the assumption of p; 
• (CON): one could be willing to assert q given the assumption of p and still reject the 
assertion of ¬p given the assumption of ¬q; 
• (FPM): from ¬p nothing follows about whether one would be willing to assert q given 
the hypothetical acceptance of p; 
• (SPM): from q nothing follows about whether one would be willing to assert q given 
the hypothetical acceptance of p. 
This means that just as the possible world account, conditional assertion theories are also 
inconsistent with (LW), (TE), (CP), (ECQ) and (TV), and would have to endorse a notion of 
 Some of the main proponents of the theory are Appiah (1985), Edgington (1986, 1995), Barker (1995), Woods 9
(1997); Derose (1999) and Derose & Grandy (1999). One could object that I’m ignoring conditional-assertion 
theories in its propositional version. These theories state that p → q is true when p and q are both true; false 
when p is true and q is false; and has no truth value when p is false, regardless of q’s truth value. In other words, 
if p is false, p → q express no proposition. See Jeffrey (1963); Manor (1974) and McDermott (1996). The reason 
why I don’t consider these views as versions of conditional-assertion theory is that this line of reasoning doesn’t 
interpret conditionals as conditional speech acts, but as categorical assertions that are null when the antecedent 
is false.
 Derose & Grandy (1999: 407).10
!6
logical consequence that has no resemblance with anything we have in mind as far as the 
subject goes. It is important to notice that not every proponent of the theory will accept this 
interpretation. Edgington (1995: 254), who is known for being the main proponent of the 
theory, objects that the invalidity of hypothetical syllogism only seems plausible due to an 
illicit context shift. In the context where both premises p → q and q → r reflected acts of 
conditional assertion, it would also be a context where p → r would be an act of conditional 
assertion. But this type of answer is inadequate because even if one would be willing to make 
an act of conditional assertion, it does not follow that she did make an act of conditional 
assertion. This concession is also inadequate because a speaker may not anticipate the 
conclusions of her previous assertion commitments. The other problem is that even if we 
could demand consistency for arguers with a fixed context requirement, this would put in 
doubt the whole conditional assertion theory enterprise, since the counter-examples to the 
material implication will also be disarmed with a fixed context (Silva, 2017).     
The relationship between the classical notion of logical consequence and the material 
implication only occurs if the later is a form of implication in its own right. This seemingly 
innocuous observation presents another challenge for conditional assertion-theories since in 
their analysis of conditional sentences they are not analysed as a form of implication, but as a 
conditional assertion act.  
What is curious is that despite their many alleged differences, possible world and 
conditional assertion theories end up facing similar difficulties. The reason lies in the shared 
intuition that motivated each theory: the Ramsey’s test. The test states that we accept p → q 
if, and only if, after the hypothetical addition of p to our belief system, and after making the 
required adjustments to maintain consistency without modifying the hypothetical belief in p, 
we would be willing to accept q . Conditional assertion theories are analogous to the 11
Ramsey’s test as follows: the theory predicts that if q is an assertive act, p → q is 
synonymous with the willingness to assert q after the hypothetical addition of p to our belief 
system, and corresponding adjustments to maintain consistency without modifying the 
hypothetical belief in p . It is also common knowledge that possible world accounts were 12
initially designed as an ontological analogue of Ramsey’s test: the closest p-world is the 
equivalent to the addition of p to our belief system after making the required adjustments to 
maintain consistency without abandoning the belief in p .  13
4. THE RICHNESS OF AN IMPLICATION HEURISTIC 
The connection between the material implication with logical consequence tout court implies 
that the discussion about the perplexities of the material implication and its alternatives 
should not be framed as conditional connective problem, but as a restricted logical 
consequence problem. This implication heuristic opens multiple gateways since it increases 
our vocabulary and invites different insights. For instance, if the material implication and, 
therefore, conditional sentences, are interpreted as claims to restricted relations of logical 
consequence, then they can also be interpreted in terms of evidential relations. We can say 
 Stalnaker (1968: 102). This is the modified and more widely discussed formulation of the test. The original 11
idea and formulation can be found in Ramsey (1929: 143).
 See Edgington (2014, sec. 3.1).12
 See Stalnaker (1968: 102).13
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that an argument is deductive if and only if conclusive favourable evidence to its conclusion 
is attributed to its premises. This approach could offer new perspectives in a variety of 
problems, including the Apartheid thesis, whether conditionals can be interpreted as 
categorical statements about facts, or how to make sense of embedded conditionals. There is 
no way of telling how much we can profit from this strategy. 
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